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Proximate Cause-Last Clear Chance-Admiralty:
Foreseeability Requirement and the "Freak Accident"
The lake vessel Shiras, owned by Kinsman Transit Company
and containing a cargo of grain owned by Continental Grain Com-
pany, was moored at Continental's dock on the Buffalo River.
The swift current forced an accumulation of ice against the ship,
causing some of its mooring lines to part. A defective "deadman"
owned by Continental to which a mooring cable had been at-
tached pulled out, then the remaining lines parted. None of the
Shiras' anchors had been put out and after the ship broke loose,
the shipkeeper was unable to lower them. Careening downriver,
the Shiras struck the Tewksbury, which also broke loose from its
moorings and both vessels drifted downstream. Some distance
further, the City of Buffalo maintained a drawbridge. Two timely
calls were made to the proper authorities but the bridge was not
raised.' The ensuing collision, which destroyed the bridge and
arrested the vessels in the wreckage, dammed the river and
flooded considerable property.
In an admiralty proceeding to adjudicate the liability of the
parties among themselves and to others suffering property dam-
age, the lower court found Kinsman, Continental, and the city all
at fault.2 Kinsman and Continental were held equally liable for
1. In its original opinion, the court of appeals concluded that one bridge
operator had left work early enroute to a tavern while the second operator
left home late and had not yet arrived. Therefore there was no chance to raise
the bridge after the peril was known. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 8s U.SL.
WEF= 2225 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 1964). In denying Continental's petition for re-
hearing, the opinion was modified to show that an operator had just arrived
when the second call was received. However, the court still felt that this
"may have been" a situation where there was no possibility to avoid the
injury because of some prior negligence. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co.,
838 F.2d 708, 720 (2d Cir. 1964).
2. Kinsman was found negligent because its shipkeeper did not prepare
to drop the anchor despite the ship's hazardous position, the swift current
and the ice conditions. Id. at 712, 714. Continental's fault was based partly
on the defective "deadman" and partly on the inadequate mooring of the
Shiras performed by both it and Kinsman. Id. at 714. The city's failure to
raise the bridge amounted to actionable fault under a regulation of the Corps
of Engineers, Department of the Army, as authorized by Congress, 28 Stat.
362 (1894), as amended, 83 U.S.C. § 499 (1958), which required that the bridge
"shall be opened promptly on signal for the passage of any vessel at all times
during the day or night . . . ." 33 C.F.R. § 20.707(e) (1962).
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damages sustained by the Tewksbury;s the city, Kinsman, and
Continental were held equally liable for damages suffered by the
flood victims; and, on the basis of the last clear chance doctrine,
the city was held solely liable for damages to Kinsman and
Continental and unable to recover from them for the damage to
the bridge.4 On appeal, the Second Circuit held the last clear
chance doctrine inapplicable and permitted division of damages
resulting from injury to the property of the three tortfeasors, but
affirmed the liability of all three parties for flood damage, holding
that a duty of care was owed to all whose property was injured
and that the unforeseeability of the manner and extent of the
harm did not bar recovery where the damages were of the sort
expectable and were caused by the very elements requiring the
exercise of greater care than was displayed. Petition of Kinsman
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WE=
3304 (U.S. March 16, 1965).
The court rejected the last clear chance contention of Kins-
man and Continental, noting that since the city left the bridge
unattended, it could not have avoided the injury.' The last clear
chance doctrine is generally held inapplicable if the defendant's
prior negligence in fact deprives him of the last chance to avoid
the accident.6 As to third parties injured by the flooding, the
court specifically based its refusal to apply the last clear chance
rule on the accepted principle that the original wrongdoer is
S. The Tewksbury's shipkeeper had left to spend the evening watching
television with his girl friend and no one was therefore present to put out the
anchor when the threatening river condition demanded it. However, exonera-
tion of the Tewksbury and its owner was affirmed by the court of appeals on
the basis that the shipkeeper's presence could not have prevented the disaster.
338 F.2d at 716.
4. Kinsman's total liability was limited to the value of the Shiras and
her freight then pending, pursuant to the Limitations of Liability Act § 3,
9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958), which allows this
limitation if the damages are incurred without the privity or knowledge of
the owner.
5. See note I supra.
6. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Nelson, 173 Fed. 915 (8th Cir. 1909);
Johnson v. Director General, 81 N.H. 289, 125 Atl. 147 (1924); Anderson v.
Bingham & Garfield Ry., 117 Utah 197, 214 P.d 607 (1950). A significant
decision to the contrary is British Columbia Elec. Ry. v. Loach [1916] 1 A.C.
719 (P.C. 1915) (B.C.). See also Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co. v. Morrison,
69 Ark. 289, 62 S.W. 1045 (1901). This area is treated in 9 HARPER & JAMES,
TonTs § 22.13 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAAES]; PRoSSER, TORTS
§ 65, at 442-43 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSsER]; Bohlen, Contribu-
tory Negligence -"Last Clear Chance," 66 U. PA. L. REv. 73 (1917); Mac-
Intyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. Rnv. 1225, 1241
(1940).
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liable for damages suffered by innocent third parties even though
another party subsequently neglects to take precautions which
could have prevented the injury.' More significant, however, is
the court's recognition that the last clear chance doctrine must
be used selectively in admiralty cases. The justification for the
doctrine in ordinary negligence cases is that it overcomes the
unjust result of denying recovery to a slightly negligent plaintiff
otherwise barred by his contributory negligence, if the defendant
had the last chance to avoid the injury.8 In admiralty, contribu-
tory negligence is not an absolute defense;' the loss in cases of
mutually caused collisions is divided equally between two negli-
gent parties.o However, if a 50/50 division of damages does not
approximate the true fault of each party or if the equal division
rule is not applicable, inequitable results may follow" and appli-
cation of the last clear chance doctrine may de desirable. The
instant court's unwillingness to employ the last clear chance rule
and thereby burden the city with the whole responsibility must
indicate that in its judgment an equal division of the damages
7. See HARPER & JAMs § 20.5, at 1146 & n.42; HART & HoNoRE, CAUSA-
TION iN THE LAW 143, 250 (1959); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 452 (1934); Mac-
Intyre, supra note 6, at 1234-35.
8. HARPER & JAArs § 22.14, at 1260-63; PROSSER § 66, at 443-44. Where
contributory negligence is not an absolute defense and where it is possible to
apportion damages on the basis of fault, the last clear chance doctrine is no
longer necessary, since plaintiff's recovery will only be defeated to the extent
of his negligence. See MacIntyre, supra note 6, at 1236, 1251-52. However, in
some jurisdictions where apportionment statutes have been enacted, the last
clear chance doctrine has been retained by the courts. See PRoSSER § 66, at
449; Maclntyre, Last Clear Chance After Thirty Years Under the Apportion-
ment Statutes, 33 CAN. B. Rnv. 257 (1955).
9. The Max Morris, 187 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. GHrIoRE & BLACK, ADimALTY 402, 404 (1957). However, in cases
where one vessel is relatively innocent, and the other is grossly negligent, the
lesser fault may be excused by the major and minor fault rule, id. at 402-03,
unless the minor fault involves a violation of statute. The Pennsylvania, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1878). On the basis of the availability of these rules, it
has been suggested that there is no need for the last clear chance doctrine in
admiralty. Mollison, Last Clear-Chance Doctrine in Admiralty, 31 INs. Coux-
sEL J. 261 (1964).
11. It would seem that completely fair results would follow only where
the contributing fault of each party is equal or where the negligence of one
is so slight as to justify a 100% recovery by application of the major and
minor fault rule. All these rules, therefore, appear to be but a crude attempt
to award damages fairly. Much better results could be achieved by appor-
tioning the damages on the basis of fault as suggested by the Brussels Colli-
sion Liability Convention of 1910, followed by most maritime nations today.
GnoRE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 439.
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better reflected the relative faults of the parties contributing to
the disaster.
The incredible sequence of events required the court to define
and limit the extent of defendants' liability. The various tests
for determining the scope of liability for negligent acts having
extraordinary consequences usually depend on the "foresee-
ability" of some factor of the occurrence.12 This is the natural
result of a system of law which developed around the concept
of fault and which exalts the underlying deterrence value of
tort liability' 4-for no one can guard against something that
he cannot foresee. The scope of liability may be limited because
either the plaintiff or the resultant damages were unforeseeable.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in the Palsgraf5 case suggests that
before the plaintiff can recover, the defendant must have
breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff and this duty only
extends to those persons to whom injury was foreseeable. Most
of the difficult cases, however, have lent themselves to an
analysis of the foreseeability of the resultant damages as a
liability limitation. The broadest approach has been to find
liability for all direct injuries, whether foreseeable or not, if
they resulted from defendant's negligence. 6 The trend, however,
12. "[N]o other consideration so affects our feeling that it is or is not just
to hold him for the result as its foreseeability . . . ." Edgerton, Legal Cause,
72 U. PA. L. REV. 343, 352 (1924); see KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW
oF ToRTs 41 (1963); Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 189, 194 (1952).
13. See KEETON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 20; Cole, Windfall and Proba-
bility: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law, 52 CALip. L. REV. 459, 498
(1964); Dias, Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy, 1962 CAM. L. J.
178, 191-92.
14. Fleming, The Passing of Polemis, 39 CAw. B. REV. 489, 502-04 (1961).
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), 59
A.L.R. 1253. For discussion of the case see, e.g., Cowan, The Riddle of the
Palsgraf Case, 23 MIN. L. REV. 46 (1938); Goodhart, The lnforeseeable
Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L. J. 449 (1930); Morris, Duty,
Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 189 (1952); Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 Mica. L. REV. 1 (1953); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the
Law of Torts, 39 COLUm. L. REV. 20, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 48 YALE L. J.
390 (1939).
Justice Cardozo's analysis was accepted in admiralty in Sinram v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1932).
16. The leading case applying this approach is In re Polemis & Furness
Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.), in which one of defendant's workmen
dropped a plank into a ship's hold, a spark was struck igniting vapors and
the ensuing fire destroyed the ship. The arbitrators found that this specific
result was not foreseeable, but the defendant was held liable on the ground
that the damages were a direct result of the negligence. Under this analysis
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has been to limit or deny liability if the type of damage occurring
is unforeseeable.17 Where the type of injury is foreseeable, fore-
seeability of the manner in which the harm occurred has not
been required.8 Similarly, the unforeseeable magnitude of the
harm actually occurring will not excuse the defendant, provided
it is of the kind expectable." In sum, the negligent actor is liable
for all damages which fall within the risk created by his con-
ducto
foreseeability is only relevant to determine whether the defendant was negli-
gent. This origin of this approach is generally credited to Smith v. London
& So. W. Ry., (1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 14. A few American jurisdictions have
adopted this reasoning, notably Minnesota. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452,
107 N.W.2d 859 (1961); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67
Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896); see Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota,
34 Mnr. L. REv. 185, 196-98 (1950).
17. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co. (The
Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 88 (P.C.) (N.S.W.). Furnace oil was carelessly
spilled on the water as the Wagon Mound was being refuelled. It eventually
reached plaintiff's wharf. Experts later testified, that no fire hazard was
created in view of the oil's high flash point. However, two days later molten
metal from welding operations on the dock fell on some rags which, acting
as a wick, ignited the floating oil and severely damaged the wharf and vessel
moored alongside. While some damage, such as fouling the wharf, was fore-
seeable, recovery was denied since ignition of the oil and damage by fire were
not foreseeable.
In the United States the leading case applying foreseeability of damages
is Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876). Although frequently
modified and flatly rejected in Minnesota, see authorities cited note 16 supra,
most American jurisdictions rely on foreseeability of damages to some extent.
See Monals, ToRTs 171 (1958); PROSSER J 50, at 290.
18. It was originally feared that the Wagon Mound decision, supra note
17, might be interpreted as requiring foreseeability of the manner in which the
injury occured. See Dias, supra note 13, at 181; Fleming, supra note 14, at
522-23; Note, 22 FAcurry or L. REv. 119, 120 (1964). This notion was subse-
quently dispelled. In Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 887 (Scot.), post
office employees had left an open manhole, covered only by a shelter tent sur-
rounded by paraffin lamps, to enjoy a tea break. While the workers were
gone, the eight year-old plaintiff started to explore the shelter. He used a
lamp to enter the manhole causing the accumulated vapors to explode and
severely burn him. Even though the manner in which the injury happened
was unforeseeable, the claim was allowed since the injury was of the kind
foreseeable by the defendant. This position is generally accepted by American
courts. See PROSSER § 50, at 307 and cases cited n.97.
19. See, e.g., McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 921, 94 N.E.
616 (1911) (plaintiff struck by taxicab died of delirium tremens precipitated
thereby); Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926)
{trivial scratch led to blood poisoning and death); 2 HARPER & JAMES § 20.5,
at 1139-41; PROSSER § 50, at 300-01; Flemming, supra note 14, at 525-27.
20. See, e.g., KEETON, op. cit. supra note 12.
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Dealing first with the Palsgraf standard of foreseeability of
plaintiffs, the instant court found that all persons injured by
the flooding belonged to the class to whom a duty of care was
owed.2 ' From the city's viewpoint it was foreseeable that failure
to raise the bridge, thereby causing a collision with two large
ships in a narrow, ice-ridden river, could result in a partial
damming which would flood property upstream from the
bridge.2 2 As to Kinsman the threat of harm to persons and
property downstream from an insecurely moored vessel was
clear, and under the existing conditions it was foreseeable that
the runaway vessel would catch along the shore, swing around,
block the ice flow, and create a dam in the narrow channel.2 3
Although the court found that flooding was unforeseeable from
Continental's viewpoint - since it could not foresee a loose
vessel during the icy river conditions which contributed to the
eventual flood damage - the wharfinger nevertheless owed a
duty to property owners downstream, since it was foreseeable
that the moored vessel might break loose because of the in-
adequate deadman and damage property on or near the river.24
Even though the instant court applied the Pasgraf test,
it apparently entertained serious doubts about its usefulness.2 5
Had there been more difficulty in bringing the claimants within
the scope of the duty, the court might have been unwilling to
follow this analysis - and justifiably so. If nonriparian property
or any property upstream from the dock had been damaged,
these "plaintiffs" would have been "unforeseeable" as to Con-
tinental and hence unable to recover from it.2 6 Such a difference
in result seems arbitrary and suggests that the standard of duty
to foreseeable plaintiffs may be an inadequate and cumbersome
21. 388 Fd at 721-22.
22. Ibid. The dissent found it highly unforeseeable that a bridge could
ever become a dam. Id. at 727.
23. Id. at 723. The Court pointed out that between the dock and the
bridge the width of the river channel does not exceed 250 feet, while the
Shiras was 425 feet long. Id. at 722, 723.
24. Id. at 728.
25.
Since all the claimants here met the Palsgraf requirement . . .
we are not obligated to reconsider whether that case furnishes as
useful a standard for determining the boundaries of liability in admiral-
ty for negligent conduct as was thought . . . when Palsgraf was still
in its infancy.
Id. at 722. See also id. at 725 where the court approvingly cites Justice An-
drews' dissenting opinion in Palsgraf.
26. Of. id. at 722 n.6.
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tool to define the extent of liability in negligence cases. The
class of persons to whom harm is foreseeable often depends upon
the type of damage foreseeable. If the two questions are dif-
ferent, it is because the Palsgraf test may incorporate a spatial
limitation on liability - a limitation often difficult to justify.
In examining the foreseeability of flood damage, the court
found that from the city's and Kinsman's viewpoint, the actual
consequences were foreseeable. Even though flooding was found
unforeseeable as to Continental, the court nevertheless held it
liable.2 7 Two interpretations of this holding are possible. The
court may have eliminated foreseeability of flood damage as a
requirement for liability and simply applied a direct causation
test"- flooding was a direct result of Continental's negligence,
therefore it is liable. Alternatively, to harmonize this decision
with those using foreseeability of result to limit the scope of
liability, the court may have regarded flooding as the manner
in which the injury occurred rather than as a type of injury.
The court's statement that so long as the injury is of the "general
sort that was expectable, unforeseeability of the exact develop-
ments and of the extent of the loss will not limit liability,"29
supports the latter interpretation. To read the case in this way,
however, strains the distinction between the manner in which
injury occurs and the type of injury to the breaking point. If
flooding is not characterized as a "type of damage," it is difficult
to see how the relevant expectable type of damage could be
anything less broad than property damage. Once this point is
reached there is no apparent reason to distinguish between
property damage and personal injury - it is only necessary that
some type of damage be foreseeable.30 This is no different than
making defendant liable for all damage resulting from his
negligence.
A significant aspect of the instant decision is that the court
recognized the limitations of any definite tests. The court sug-
gested dealing with each case individually and considering such
policy factors as insurance or other loss-sharing methods." The
result approaches the position of Judge Andrews' dissent in
Palsgraf - in the last analysis the scope of liability question is
27. Id. at 723-24.
28. See note 19 supra.
29. 338 F.2d at 726.
30. Fleming, supra note 14, at 521-P2.
31. 338 F.2d at 725-26.
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simply one of expediency and of fairness.32
This broad approach, which permits open consideration of
policy factors, is perhaps the most desirable way to deal with
scope of liability questions - especially in "freak accident"
cases. Facts and backgrounds vary so much that a definitive test
cannot apply fairly to all situations. Further, the concept of
foreseeability, although once having a preferred position in a
system based primarily on fault, is not the only determining
factor today. Although accident prevention and compensation
are still the two primary functions of tort law; the emphasis
upon the latter has increased in recent years." Liability beyond
fault can be no more offensive than letting an innocent plaintiff
suffer the total loss. Increasing consideration is given to the
shifting of loss from the plaintiff to a defendant who can pass
it on as a small fraction of the cost of doing business or where
this loss distribution is likely to be performed by insurance."3
Although unable to divorce itself completely from the fault
concept and desiring to retain a degree of certainty in tort law,
the present court's express willingness to let the question of the
extent of liability be determined in large measure by under-
lying policy considerations rather than doctrinaire tests is in
tune with the modern concept of the law.
32. Id. at 725, citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354-55,
162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
33. See Cowan, supra note 15, at 66; Fleming, supra note 14, at 502, 506.
34. See id. at 506; Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 30
(1953).
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